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This  paper  develops  a theory  of the  allocation  of formal  authority 
(the  right to decide)  and real authority  (the  effective  control  over 
decisions)  within  organizations,  and  it  illustrates  how  a formally 
integrated  structure  can  accommodate  various  degrees  of  "real" 
integration.  Real authority  is determined  by the structure  of infor- 
mation,  which  in turn depends  on  the allocation  of formal  author- 
ity. An increase  in an agent's  real authority  promotes  initiative  but 
results  in  a  loss  of  control  for  the  principal.  After  spelling  out 
(some  of)  the  main  determinants  of the  delegation  of formal  au- 
thority within  organizations,  the  paper  examines  a number  of fac- 
tors that increase  the subordinates'  real authority in a formally inte- 
grated  structure:  overload,  lenient  rules,  urgency  of  decision, 
reputation,  performance  measurement,  and multiplicity  of superi- 
ors.  Finally,  the  amount  of  communication  in  an  organization  is 
shown  to depend  on  the  allocation  of formal  authority. 
I.  Introduction 
Over 40 years ago, Herbert Simon defined authority as the right to 
select actions affecting part or the whole of an organization.' As 
We are grateful to Oliver Hart and Martin  Hellwig for helpful discussions;  to Pat- 
rick Bolton, Leonardo Felli, an anonymous referee, and especially Denis Gromb 
and David Martimort  for helpful comments on a first draft; and to the Centre Na- 
tional d'Etudes des Telecommunications for financial support. 
1 "We will say that [the boss] exercises authority  over [the worker] if [the worker] 
permits [the boss] to select x [a 'behavior,' i.e., any element of the set of specific 
actions that the worker  performs on the job]. That is, [the worker] accepts authority 
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pointed  out by Grossman and Hart (1986)  and Hart and Moore 
(1990), authority may be conferred by the ownership of an asset, 
which gives the owner the right to make decisions concerning the 
use of this asset.  Authority  may more generally result from an explicit 
or implicit contract allocating the right to decide on specified mat- 
ters to a member or group of members of the organization. 
This formal authority,  however,  need  not  confer  real authority, that 
is, an effective control over decisions, on its holder. For example, it 
is commonplace to observe that shareholders have limited control 
over their board of directors,  which itself may be subject to the domi- 
nation of the top executives, who in turn often rubber-stamp the 
divisions' projects, and so forth. Similarly,  the president of a country 
really controls only a small number of the decisions made by the 
executive branch. This paper develops a theory of the allocation of 
formal authority  within organizations and of the separation between 
formal authority  and real authority, thereby showing how a formally 
integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" in- 
tegration. 
Our approach follows Max Weber's (1968) description of "ratio- 
nal" or "legal" authority.  Weber notes that officials, employees, and 
workers  attached to the administrative  staff of a bureaucracy  do not 
themselves own the nonhuman means of production and adminis- 
tration, yet they may exert substantial  control over the bureaucratic 
machinery (pp. 217-25).  As in Weber, the key to our analysis of 
formal versus real authority is asymmetric information. A principal 
who has formal authority over a decision (or activity) can always  re- 
verse her subordinate's decision but will refrain from doing so if the 
subordinate is much better informed and if their objectives are not 
too antinomic. We formalize this idea in a straightforward  way. The 
subordinate exerts effort (shows initiative) to suggest a project to 
the principal. The principal also chooses how much to learn about 
the potential project. Once informed, the subordinate recommends 
a project that sometimes is not optimal for the principal, because 
from the point of view of the agent this project creates a higher 
private benefit, yields better career opportunities, or requires less 
effort to be implemented than the optimal project. Formal authority 
prevails when the principal is informed, as she then  chooses her 
preferred project (which may or may not coincide with the subordi- 
nate's proposal). In contrast, a poorly informed principal optimally 
when his behavior is determined by [the boss's] decision. In general, [the worker] 
will accept authority  only if xO,  the x chosen by [the boss], is restricted to some given 
subset ([the worker's] 'area of acceptance') of all the possible values. This is the 
definition of authority that is most generally employed in modem  administrative 
theory" (Simon 1951, p. 294). See alsoJennergren  (1981). FORMAL AND  REAL AUTHORITY  3 
rubber-stamps  the subordinate's proposal by fear of picking a worse 
alternative. The subordinate then has real, although no formal, au- 
thority. For instance, a principal who is overloaded with too many 
activities  under her formal authority and therefore has little time to 
acquire the relevant information on each activity  loses effective con- 
trol and involuntarily endorses many suboptimal projects. 
Our analysis suggests two main benefits of delegating  formal au- 
thority. First, the transfer of formal authority to an agent credibly 
increases the  agent's initiative  or  incentive  to acquire information 
(which in turn reduces the principal's overload); for such a transfer 
prevents the principal from overruling the agent in those situations 
(a la Grossman and Hart [1986])  in which both parties have ac- 
quired the relevant information about the potential projects' pay- 
offs. In addition, transferring authority over activities or decisions 
that matter relatively more to the agent than to the principal and 
for which the principal's overruling might hurt the agent will facili- 
tate the agent's participation  in the contractual relationship. The cost 
of delegating formal authority is the principal's loss of control over 
the choice of projects. 
Even when the principal retains formal authority, a number of 
factors tend to generate both initiative and loss of control. One such 
factor is a wide span of control, which raises the principal's marginal 
cost of monitoring each agent. We show that there is a sense in which 
optimal organizations always  function in a situation of overload. Al- 
ternatively, the gain from the principal's intervention can be  re- 
duced by spreading its benefits among several principals/owners; 
intervention can also be made more difficult by splitting property 
rights among several superiors (as in the case of a matrix organiza- 
tion or multiministry  oversight) and by requiring that intervention 
be unanimously agreed on. Other factors that increase initiative in- 
clude the urgency of decision making, which does not give the supe- 
rior much time for a thorough investigation; repeated interaction, 
which allows  the superior to develop a reputation for not intervening 
in matters that are relatively  inconsequential to her and for interven- 
ing only in important matters;  and improved performance measure- 
ment. 
Finally, our approach enables us to provide a modest, but first, 
step toward the integration of "collective bounded rationality" and 
incentives and toward the endogenization of the limits of commu- 
nication.  The  basic idea  is  to  depart from  the  traditional team 
theoretic framework of the literature on  communication to allow 
members to have dissonant objectives. The communication of infor- 
mation is then strategic and depends on the authority relationship. 
In particular,  less communication may take place if the principal has 4  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
formal authority because the agent is concerned that the principal 
might abuse her authority once she is well informed. This will typi- 
cally be the case if the principal's and subordinate's objectives are 
sufficiently dissonant. In the opposite case in which these objectives 
are sufficiently  congruent, we show that communication may instead 
be encouraged by the agent's subordination to the principal. 
Although our analysis is, to the best of our knowledge, new, it 
makes use of building blocks developed by other authors. The moral 
hazard and property rights literatures supplied the two polar cases. 
A seminar given by Diego Rodriguez and Dimitri Vayanos at MIT in 
1991 contained several seeds of the basic model  described here.2 
Papers  by Riordan (1990), Schmidt (1991), and Cremer (1995) have 
shown in different contexts that too much information may hurt 
a principal.' Riordan argues that information allows principals to 
expropriate the agents' specific investments. He provides a defini- 
tion of vertical integration based on information. Cremer (in the 
context of a corporation) and Schmidt (in a paper on privatization) 
show that poor  information  allows principals to  avoid  (ex  ante 
costly) renegotiation of long-term contracts  with agents. In Cremer's 
paper, the principal publicly chooses the accuracy of a technology 
used to monitor the agent's type. A more accurate technology re- 
duces the agent's incentive to work to signal high ability. Riordan 
and Schmidt discuss property rights and, in the tradition of Arrow 
(1975), posit (but do not formally  establish) a link between property 
rights and information structure. So, the observation that too much 
information can hurt the principal is not novel. Our theoretical con- 
tribution is the description of the two-way  interaction between au- 
thority and information, and the study of when lower layers really 
have a say in decision making (issue of real authority) and of which 
tasks are likely to be delegated  (issue of formal authority). 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the model. 
Section III identifies the basic trade-off  between loss of control and 
initiative. Section IV analyzes the determinants of the allocation of 
formal authority  within an organization. They include, first, the "rel- 
ative willingness to pay for authority," which reflects the parties' 
stakes as well as the congruence of their preferences; second, the 
principal's information and the importance of the agent's initiative; 
and, third, the importance of communication between the parties. 
Section V looks at factors favoring the agent's initiative when the 
2Their  1993 discussion paper focuses on themes different from the ones consid- 
ered here. 
'The  literature on the ratchet effect also emphasizes a cost for a principal from 
being well informed. FORMAL AND  REAL AUTHORITY  5 
principal has formal authority (overload, urgency of decision, repu- 
tation, better performance measurement, and multiple principals), 
and it derives implications for business management. Section VI 
summarizes the paper. 
II.  The Model 
A hierarchy composed of a principal (she) and an agent (he)  can 
implement one or zero project. The principal hires the agent to col- 
lect information about and implement the project. Examples of hier- 
archies  we have in mind are a board of directors/management, chief 
executive officer/division manager, thesis advisor/student, supervi- 
sor/worker, or supranational authority/country. 
Projects.-The agent screens among n '  3 potential and a priori 
identical projects on behalf of the principal. With each project k E 
{1,.  . .,  n} is associated a verifiable monetary gain or profit Bk for 
the principal and a private benefit bk  for the agent. (These payoffs 
are gross of any monetary transfer between the two parties.) The 
agent's private benefit includes perks on the job, acquisition of hu- 
man capital, the possibility  of signaling ability,  or (minus) the disutil- 
ity of implementing the project. If no project is implemented, the 
profit and the private benefit are both equal to zero. "No project" 
can formally  be treated as project 0, with known payoffs Bo  =  bo  = 0. 
For each party,  at least one project yields a "sufficiently  negative" 
payoff. In some  anticipation, this will imply that an uninformed 
agent  prefers to  confess  ignorance  and  to  recommend  inaction 
rather than to recommend a specific project, and that similarly  an 
uninformed principal would not choose by herself to undertake a 
project. 
The principal's preferred project yields known profit B. Similarly, 
the agent's preferred project yields known private benefit b. If the 
principal's preferred project is chosen, the agent receives expected 
private  benefit fib; the expectation refers to the ex ante uninformed 
situation in which all projects look alike. Similarly,  if the agent's pre- 
ferred project is chosen, the principal receives expected profit oB. 
The congruence parameters  a and f belong to (0, 1]  .' If information 
4'These  congruence parameters  will be treated as exogenous  in the following analy- 
sis. However,  one could think of various  methods whereby the principal might affect 
congruence with her subordinates:  e.g., investments in the recruiting and training 
of new employees, design of career profiles, or enforcement of (contractual) rules 
restricting the subordinates' set of possible actions. Also, the level of congruence 
might be affected by incentives to implement the project once it is chosen (De Bijl 
1994, 1995). Another interesting determinant of a is the possibility  that other agents 
working for the principal are affected by the activity  of this agent. Our focus on 
private benefits does not preclude the existence of other factors influencing the 
allocation of authority  such as the relative competency of the two parties. Who gets 6  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
is hard, we shall further assume that a party's preferred project al- 
ways yields a positive payoff to the other party (it is trivial to relax 
this assumption, at the expense of additional notation). 
A special case of the payoff structure  described above occurs when 
only two of the n projects are "serious" or "relevant," in that they 
yield nonnegative profit and benefit whereas the other projects  yield 
negative payoffs. One of the two relevant projects yields profit B > 0 
to the principal and the other zero. Similarly,  one of the two relevant 
projects yields private  benefit b > 0 to the agent, and the other zero. 
The ex ante probability that the same project is preferred by both 
is a  =  PE  (0, 1], the parameter of congruence. 
Preferences.-The  principal is risk neutral and has utility Bk -  Wif 
project k is chosen, and w is the wage paid to the agent. The agent 
is protected by limited liability, so w '  0. The agent's utility is then 
u(w)  +  bk,  where u(.)  is increasing and concave. 
For expositional simplicity  we shall assume that the agent is infi- 
nitely averse  to income risk.  He therefore does not respond to mone- 
tary  incentives and receives a constant wage equal to his reservation 
wage of  zero. Alternatively, the  agent  may not  be  infinitely risk 
averse, but the principal's benefit  is noncontractible; the agent's 
wage is then again a constant. (Section VB shows that the model 
can be straightforwardly  extended to allow the agent to respond to 
monetary incentives. Profit sharing then lowers the principal's and 
raises the agent's utility from picking a profitable project.) 
Information.-To reflect the nonroutine  nature of  the decision 
over which authority  may be delegated to the agent, we assume that 
the nature of projects' payoffs  is initially  unknown to both the princi- 
pal and the agent. The agent acquires information in a binary  form. 
At private cost gA(e), he perfectly learns the payoffs of all candidate 
projects with probability e. With probability 1 -  e, the agent learns 
nothing and still views the projects as identical. 
Similarly,  the principal chooses how much time or effort to devote 
to learning payoffs. At private cost gp(E), she becomes perfectly in- 
formed about the payoffs  with probability  E and learns nothing with 
probability  1  -  E. 
The principal's acquisition of information can be contemporane- 
ous with the agent's or else start  after the agent makes his report. We 
shall refer to these two possibilities as the simultaneous  and sequential 
models, respectively.  Which variant  is more relevant depends on the 
context. Sequential investigations usually are less time-consuming 
his way may also depend on the bargaining power of the various parties or on the 
desire of the organization to keep key personnel in the long run (Rotemberg 1993, 
1994). FORMAL  AND  REAL  AUTHORITY  7 
for the principal, who can already build on an existing report. On 
the other hand, the principal may not want to wait until the report 
accrues to start her investigation, since otherwise she may be forced 
to accept the agent's proposal by lack of time.5  Because the simulta- 
neous and sequential cases yield essentially  the same results,  we shall 
focus on the simultaneous case and content ourselves with illustrat- 
ing the sequential case in Section VE. We leave the endogenization 
of the timing (simultaneous vs. sequential) for future research. 
The disutilities of effort gA(.)  and gp(*) are increasing and strictly 
convex and satisfy  gi(O)  =  0, g(0)  =  0, and g(l)  =  o?,  i  =  A, P. 
Communication.-In most of the paper we can assume that infor- 
mation is either hard  or soft.  Hard information about a project's pay- 
offs can be costlessly and instantaneously  verified by the other party 
if communicated by the party  who collected it. Soft information can- 
not be verified by the other party,  and therefore its communication 
must be interpreted as a pure suggestion for a project choice. The 
specific results of Section VE rely on the existence of soft informa- 
tion. 
Authority.-In the case of P-formal authority (which we shall occa- 
sionally label "integration"), the principal has the formal authority 
and is called the "superior." The principal may always  overrule the 
agent  (the "subordinate"). She indeed does so if she is informed 
and if the agent's recommendation is not "congruent." In this case, 
the principal has both the formal and real authority  over the choice 
of project and can fully dispense with the agent's information and 
recommendation.  Otherwise, she  (optimally)  rubber-stamps the 
agent's proposal since a  >  0. We shall then say that the agent has 
real  authority. 
Our payoff structure implies that there is no need to include an 
"exit option" for the subordinate, for the superior always  makes a 
decision that yields nonnegative expected utility to both. The stan- 
dard institution of letting subordinates quit if they are unhappy with 
their superiors' decisions emerges naturally in the variant of our 
model in which the principal's preferred project may impose a sub- 
stantial loss of utility for the agent. 
Under  A-formal authority (which we  shall also label  "delega- 
tion"),  the "independent  agent," if informed, picks his preferred 
project and cannot be overruled by the principal. That is, the agent 
now has formal authority.  Note that this covers the situation in which 
the agent is an employee who contractually receives an irrevocable 
'For  instance, directors of a company or external members of a thesis jury are 
usually  forced to rubber-stamp  the annual report or to accept the thesis if they have 
waited until receiving the documents to become involved. 8  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
right to make this particular decision. Indeed, there is in general 
not one but many decisions to be picked in an organization. Accord- 
ingly, a given organization may admit many intermediate allocations 
of formal (and not only real) authority between a fully integrated 
organization, in which the principal has formal authority over all 
decisions, and a fully disintegrated organization.  A contract, a corpo- 
rate charter, customs, and the law may endow the agent with the 
right to make specific decisions, leaving the principal in charge of 
the remaining ones. For example, the directors of a corporation, 
who are agents for (in particular) the shareholders, have wide pow- 
ers, with shareholders having formal authority  only in specific issues 
(fundamental changes such as a change in corporate charter or a 
merger, decisions on which directors have conflicts of interest, or 
election of directors). Within corporations, there has been de facto 
a recent trend in management toward "empowerment" and "team- 
work," which by and large amount to a reassignment of some deci- 
sion rights to lower tiers of the hierarchy.6 
Contracts.-We  adopt an incomplete contracting approach (Gross- 
man and Hart 1986) by positing that projects cannot be described 
and contracted on ex ante. The initial contract specifies an alloca- 
tion of formal authority (control rights) to only one of the two par- 
ties. 
The timing is as follows: (i) The principal proposes a contract that 
allocates formal authority to her or to the agent over the future 
choice  of  projects;7 (ii)  the  parties privately gather information 
about the n projects' payoffs;  (iii) the party  who does not  have formal 
authority communicates to  the controlling party a subset (of his 
choice)  of the relevant projects' payoffs he has learned; and  (iv) 
the controlling party picks a project (or none)  on the basis of his 
information and the information communicated by the other party. 
Payoffs under the two allocations of authority.-Under  P-formal  au- 
thority (integration), the utilities are 
up =  EB +  (1  -E)  eaB  -  gp(E)  (1) 
and 
'Anecdotal  evidence on the delegation of formal authority  within organizations 
is contained in the celebrated work by Chandler (1962) on  Strategy  and Structure. 
This work provides a detailed description of how large companies such as Du Pont, 
General Motors, and Standard  Oil, after having greatly expanded the scope of their 
production activities, decided to change their organizational mode toward a more 
decentralized structure. 
7 That is, we assume that there is, ex ante, a competitive supply  of potential agents, 
so that the allocation of authority  between the two parties is the one that maximizes 
the principal's ex ante expected utility. FORMAL AND  REAL AUTHORITY  9 
UA =  Ebb +  (1 -  E)eb  -  gA(e).  (2) 
That is, with probability  E, the principal is informed and picks her 
preferred project. With probability 1  -  E, the  principal is unin- 
formed. With probability e, the agent is informed and suggests his 
preferred project. The principal then either learns from his recom- 
mendation her payoff attached to this project (hard information) 
or is still uncertain about whether the agent proposes her preferred 
project (soft information). Either way, the principal optimally rub- 
ber-stamps  the agent's proposal.8 
Under A-formal  authority (delegation) when informed, the agent 
simply  chooses his preferred project. When the agent is uninformed 
and the principal is informed, the principal suggests her preferred 
project, which is then implemented by the agent. So, with the super- 
script d for "delegation," preferences are 
u=  eaB  +  (1  -  e)EB  -  gp(E)  (3) 
and 
A=  eb +  (1  -  e)E!}b -  gA(e).  (4) 
Note that the agent's lack of responsiveness to monetary incentives 
precludes any ex post renegotiation of the exercise of authority. 
Remark on complete  contracts.-To  put  the  incomplete  contracting 
approach somewhat in perspective, our discussion paper (Aghion 
and Tirole 1994) explored the polar assumption that projects can 
be described and contracted on ex ante, even though their payoffs 
are ex ante unknown to both parties.  It is interesting that under weak 
assumptions, the optimal complete contract corresponds exactly to 
a possibly random authority allocation scheme as long as the agent 
does not respond to monetary incentives. (See Tirole [1994] for a 
further discussion of when an incomplete contract approach to au- 
thority  yields the same outcome as the complete contract, unknown 
payoffs approach.) 
I That the principal's  formal authority  becomes entirely ineffective when the prin- 
cipal is uninformed follows from the specific payoff structure, in particular from 
the principal's weakly preferring a (relevant) noncongruent project to no project 
at all. To see this, consider the following example: there are three "relevant" proj- 
ects (thus n 2  4), say k =  1, 2, and 3 (the principal does not know that the relevant 
projects are projects 1-3).  Project 3 yields a strictly  negative profit to the principal, 
whereas projects 1 and 2 yield (as above) a nonnegative profit. Then, if information 
is hard, the principal, whenever uninformed, can still use her formal authority in 
order to elicit information about project 3 vs. projects 11, 21 from the agent. The 
principal will then rubber-stamp  the agent's decision only if information ruling out 
the negative-profit  project has been disclosed to her. 10  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
III.  The  Basic  Trade-off  between  Loss  of  Control 
and Initiative 
Consider  the  case  in which  the  principal  has formal  authority.  The 
reaction  curves in  information  gathering  for  the  principal  and  the 
agent  are defined  by the  first-order  conditions 
(I  -  cce)  B =  g(E)  (5) 
and 
(1  -E)b  g'(e).  (6) 
The  principal  supervises  more,  the  higher  her  stake and  the  lower 
the congruence  parameter  oa  and the agent's  effort. The  agent  dem- 
onstrates more initiative,  the higher  his private benefit  and the lower 
the  principal's  interference. 
We  assume  that  the  two  systems  of  equations  {(5),  (6)1  have  a 
unique,  stable  intersection  (E,  e).'  (Such  an  assumption  is  not 
needed  in the sequential  case: Because  the principal  acquires  infor- 
mation  only  if  the  agent  makes  a proposal,  E is independent  of  e 
and  the  stability condition  is automatically  satisfied.)  0 
The  fact  that  the  agent's  reaction  curve  (6)  is downward sloping 
is a crucial  feature  of  this  (or  any)  initiative  model.  In  contrast,  if 
the agent's  reaction  curve were  upward sloping,  the principal  would 
never want to reduce  her  degree  of interference  E for strategic  rea- 
sons. This latter case might  correspond  either  to a situation  of strate- 
gic  complementarity  if the  principal's  reaction  curve were  also up- 
ward sloping  or to a supervision  situation  if the  principal's  reaction 
curve were  downward  sloping.  (A well-known  example  in which  the 
agent's  reaction  curve  is upward  sloping  is the  monitoring  model. 
In contrast  to our model,  in monitoring  [or costly state verification] 
models,  what constitutes  a wrong action  is known in advance  to both 
parties:  engage  in  strategic  default  [borrower],  cheat  the  Internal 
Revenue  Service  [taxpayer],  embezzle  corporate  resources  [man- 
ager],  etc.  In a monitoring  model,  an increase  in the  principal's  ef- 
fort to measure  or verify ex post the agent's  performance  will unam- 
biguously  induce  the  agent  to  behave  better.  In  our  model,  an 
increase  in the principal's  effort worsens performance  measurement 
by lowering  the  impact  of the  agent's  action  on  outcome,  and  thus 
reduces  the  agent's  effort.) 
9That  is, ccibB  <  g' (E) gX(e). 
1  For example,  with soft information,  the principal's  payoff in the  sequential  case 
is 
up  =e  [EB +  (1  -  E)oaB  -  gp(E)]1. FORMAL  AND  REAL AUTHORITY  11 
Suppose now that for some "exogenous" reason (e.g., because of 
overload), the marginal cost of effort of the principal (i.e., g')  in- 
creases. The effect on the principal's expected payoff is a priori am- 
biguous. On the one hand, ceteris paribus, the principal's probabil- 
ity of becoming informed about the projects' payoffs (E) decreases 
(see eq.  [5]); the principal thus loses real authority (i.e., control) 
over the choice of project, with a higher resulting risk of having to 
endorse suboptimal projects. On the other hand, the reduction in 
the principal's intervention E encourages initiative from the subor- 
dinate (see eq.  [6]),  which in turn raises the principal's expected 
(monetary) benefit. 
IV.  The Optimal Allocation of Formal Authority 
When should formal authority be  allocated to the principal and 
when should it instead be delegated to the agent? In the following 
subsections we identify some determinants of the allocation of for- 
mal authority in organizations. Both incentive (initiative) and indi- 
vidual rationality (participation) considerations appear to be rele- 
vant, although  the  two corresponding  approaches to  delegation 
have different and complementary testable implications: see subsec- 
tion C below. 
A.  The Incentive View of Delegation 
Both the delegation of formal responsibility described by Chandler 
(1962) in his study of Du Pont and General Motors and the recent 
move toward empowerment and teamwork  were officially motivated 
by the need to increase initiative at lower layers of the hierarchy. 
In terms of our model, when formal authority is delegated to the 
agent, the reaction curves of the principal and the agent become, 
respectively, 
(1-  e)B =gp  (E)  (7) 
and 
(1 P-E)  b =  gA(e).  (8) 
Assuming again that {(7),  (8)} yields a unique, stable equilibrium 
(Ed,  ed),11  one  can show that E >  Ed and  e <  ed.  Delegation  thus 
increases the agent's initiative; because the principal cannot over- 
" The stability  condition is the same as in the case of P-formal authority, except 
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rule the agent,  the agent  has more  incentives  to become  informed.'2 
The cost of leaving initiative to the agent,  on the other hand,  is again 
a loss  of  control  (both  formal  and  real  since  the  principal  has less 
incentive  to become  informed  when  she  delegates  formal  authority 
to the  agent)."3 
Remark.-The  result that delegated  projects  require  less attention 
has implications  for the choice  of activities under  alternative  author- 
ity structures.  The  monetary  rates of return  take no  account  of  the 
activity's use  of an unpriced  scarce  corporate  resource,  namely  the 
principal's  time  and  attention.  Therefore,  internal  activities  should 
receive  a handicap  relative to external  ones.  In particular,  in a situa- 
tion  in which  corporate  headquarters  must  decide  which  activities 
should  be  pursued  internally  and  which  should  be  delegated,  the 
former  should  face  a higher  hurdle  rate  than  the  latter  since  they 
make  more  use  of  the  headquarters'  time. 
B.  The Participation Viezw  of Delegation 
Our basic  model  emphasizes  the  role  of delegation  in fostering  in- 
centives.  In practice,  delegation  of formal  authority  also plays a role 
in  ensuring  the  agent's  participation.  For example,  the  delegation 
to the  agent  of choices  relative  to clothing,  hairdo,  out-of-work life- 
style, or other personal  matters often  has minor  incentive  effects and 
substantial importance  for the agent. The  direct determinants  of the 
allocation  of formal authority are obtained  by focusing  on individual 
rationality  and  setting  aside  effort  elasticity  considerations. 
Delegating  a choice  to the agent  raises his utility and  enables  the 
12  A referee wondered about the possible negative effect of delegation on incen- 
tives: Suppose that there exists an (n +  1) th project A, which, without the agent's 
having to investigate, is known to yield a positive payoff bA>  IBb  to the agent and 
a negative payoff BA  <  0 to the principal. Then, one can show that delegating formal 
authority to the agent may result in a reduction  of the agent's effort (i.e., e >  ed)! 
Indeed, while e remains determined by the first-order  condition (6), now the agent's 
effort ed when formal authority  is delegated to him solves the maximization  program 
max{eb  +  (1 -  e) bA  -  gA(e)}; 
i.e., ed satisfies the new first-order  condition 
b -  bA  =  gA(e  d),  (8') 
which in turn yields ed  <  e when bA>  fib  and E is sufficiently small. This, however, 
does not invalidate our analysis  in this section. For the optimal contract will always 
involve either ruling out project A (which yields a negative payoff to the principal) 
a priori if A's payoffs are known ex ante to both parties or introducing contingent 
veto powers (as in Tirole [1994]) if A's payoffs are learned only ex post. In either 
case, we obtain again that ed>  e. 
13 Our model thus explains why the absence of integration (where "integration" is 
understood as P-formal  authority)  corresponds, as is often suggested in the literature 
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principal  either  to lower the wage or to recoup  authority on another 
decision,  while  keeping  the  agent's  individual  rationality  constraint 
satisfied.  We delay  the  study of monetary  incentives  until  Section  V 
and  here  focus  on  a multitask  version  of  the  basic  model.  Suppose 
that there  are m independent  decisions,  k =  1, . . .,  m. Each decision 
k  is characterized  by profit Bk, private benefit  bk,  congruence  parame- 
ters ak  and  Pk, and  efforts Ek and  ek. To  isolate  the  direct  effects,  we 
ignore  the  incentive  constraints  and  take Ek and  ek as given.  Let  xk 
=  1 if  the  principal  keeps  control  of  decision  k and  xk =  0  if  the 
decision  is delegated.  The optimal  delegation  pattern maximizes  the 
principal's  payoff  subject  to  the  agent's  participation  constraint: 
max>I  {[Ek +  (1  -  Ek) ek  k] xk +  [ek  ck  +  (1  -  ek)Ek]  (1  -  xk)}Bk 
x}  k 
subject  to 
Z  {[Ekk  +  (1 
-  Ek)ek]xk 
k  (IR) 
+  [ek  +  (1  -  ek)Ek  k] (1 
-  xk)}bk  Wi. 
Letting  ,u denote  the  multiplier  of  the  participation  constraint,  we 
obtain  the  following  intuitive  result: 
bk(l  -  Pk)  1  bkl 
P)-<  -=>  Xk  =  1 
Bk (1 
-  ak)  J  (9) 
>  ->  Xk =  0. 
In the absence  of incentive  considerations,  delegation  decisions  are 
driven  by the  relative  willingness  to  pay for  authority.  Ceteris  pari- 
bus,  delegation  is more  likely for  those  decisions  that  matter  little 
to the principal,  either  because  they involve  little cash flow  (Bk low) 
or because  the  agent  can be  trusted  (xk  high),  and  that are impor- 
tant to the agent,  either  because  private benefits  are high  (bk high) 
or because  the  principal  cannot  refrain  from  hurting  the  agent  (Pk 
low). 
It is interesting  to note  that the allocation  of formal  authority  de- 
fined  by (9) is independent  of efforts. Authority on a decision  makes 
a difference  only when  both  parties  are informed  about  the  conse- 
quences  of the decision.  The cost and benefit  of delegating  authority 
on decision  k are both  proportional  to the probability Ekek  that infor- 
mation  is shared.  By contrast,  effort  considerations  are  crucial  for 
the  incentive  effects  of  the  allocation  of authority. 14  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
C.  Delegation of Authority: Testable  Implications 
The "incentive view" (subsection A) and the "participation view" 
(subsection B) yield complementary determinants of the allocation 
of formal authority. We analyze their testable implications in  se- 
quence. We indicate why we think these implications are realistic, 
although only more thorough studies based on the structural  model 
can deliver conclusive evidence. 
1.  Relative Willingness to Pay for Authority 
Participation  considerations lead to an allocation of formal authority 
on  decisions  k =  1, . . . , n based  on  the  relative willingness  to pay 
Bk(l  -  ak)/bk(l  -  Pk)  of the two parties. From this, we have derived 
the following simple implications: (a) Only decisions that are rela- 
tively unimportant  for the principal  (Bk/  bk  low) should  be delegated, 
as has been  documented  in the organizational design literature.'4 
(b) Decisions for which the principal cannot trust the agent (ak  low) 
or for which the agent can trust the principal (Pk high) should not 
be delegated. These congruence effects seem to fit with empirical 
evidence on authority conferred on corporate divisions. A division 
manager's preferred decisions are likely to be very suboptimal for 
the firm (ak low) when there are substantial externalities on other 
divisions, on future managers of the division, or on the firm as a 
whole. And, traditionally, long-term investment decisions or deci- 
sions having an impact on the rest of the firm's image or strategy 
(such as advertising  or bargaining with unions) have been kept cen- 
tralized. By contrast, managerial decisions concerning almost exclu- 
sively  the division at present, such as manufacturing, purchasing, or 
short-term investment, are very often delegated to the division. 
Similarly, our conclusion  that the likelihood  of  delegation  de- 
creases with the congruence parameter Pk seems consistent with ca- 
sual observation. Employees are willing to relinquish authority to 
managers they trust. Conversely,  contracts or the law should prevent 
employees against having to comply with orders to implement poli- 
cies they find offensive (such as covering up a scandal, polluting a 
river, etc.). 
2.  Initiative as a Determinant of Delegation 
Viewed from the incentive perspective, the impact of payoff and con- 
gruence parameters is less clear-cut. Consider, for example, an in- 
14  Facts  on which decisions are delegated can be found, e.g., inJennergren (1981). 
Incidentally, the definitions of formal and real authority  used in the organizational 
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crease in the principal's profit Bk. On the one hand, the decision is 
more important for the principal, which increases the cost of the 
loss in control associated with delegation. On the other hand, the 
increase in Bk leads to more monitoring and further stifling of initia- 
tive. One parameter, though, yields an unambiguous prediction. As 
with the participation view, an increase in the agent's trust in the 
principal (ok)  makes centralization  more desirable:  This increase has 
no  impact on  the principal's payoff under centralization and re- 
duces the agent's effort under delegation. 
The incentive view may be the key to understanding delegation 
decisions that respond to changes in information acquisition. (Re- 
call from subsection B that the participation view does not assign a 
direct role for information acquisition in explaining authority pat- 
terns.) We already  noted that the delegation of responsibility  to divi- 
sions and the move toward empowerment are usually motivated by 
initiative considerations. To provide a further illustration, suppose 
that the principal's probability of being informed on a given issue 
is exogenous, since it stems from public information or the princi- 
pal's past experience rather than from a current search by the princi- 
pal. A quick inspection  of equation  (3)  shows that the principal 
should retain authority when she is very well informed  (Ek high)'5 
since initiative becomes a minor consideration. For example, one 
would predict that the principal would keep decision rights for those 
activities  that she knows  very  well from experience, namely the "core 
competencies."16 
D.  Intermediate  Allocations of Formal Authority 
Our analysis  so far has concentrated on the benefits and costs of the 
full delegation of formal authority  over a decision or set of decisions. 
In practice, however, one commonly observes "intermediate" pat- 
terns of delegation, with decision rights being delegated "condition- 
ally" or to a third party (middleman) with intermediate objectives 
between the principal's and the agent's. 
1.  Contingent Delegation 
Sometimes a principal delegates authority to an agent but keeps the 
possibility of reestablishing authority at the expense of a high cost 
15  If Ek 2  cak, under delegation the principal prefers the agent to be uninformed. 
Hence, she might as well keep the decision right. 
16  Similarly,  we would predict that, when a change in a division is desirable, the 
decision is more likely to be decentralized if the change is "innovative"  rather than 
"imitative" (since, for imitative changes, the principal obtains substantial  informa- 
tion from the experience of other firms or other units). There is some evidence, 
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of  intervention.  For  example,  the  agent  does  not  need  prior  ap- 
proval to make  a decision  and  to get  an activity going,  whereas  the 
principal  may engage  in an ex post  evaluation  and stop  operations. 
Overruling  the agent  is then  quite  costly and occurs  only if the prin- 
cipal discovers  that the loss from noncongruence  is substantial.  One 
can then  speak of "contingent  delegation"  in that the principal  does 
not always overrule  the agent when  he learns that some  other  course 
of events would have been  more profitable.  The formalization  of this 
idea  involves  a straightforward  extension  of  our  analysis: Suppose 
that  there  are  two relevant  projects  and  that  B is ex  ante  random 
instead  of  deterministic:  B is equal  to  B or  B, where  0  <  B <  B. 
Suppose  that  reversing  a project  costs  c E  (B,  B)  once  the  project 
is started. We  can  now  compare  three  allocations  of  authority:  two 
allocations,  P-formal  authority  or  no  delegation  (the  agent  needs 
prior approval)  and A-formal authority or full delegation  (the princi- 
pal cannot  overrule  the agent),  are as described  in the previous  sec- 
tions  (with  B now  denoting  the  expectation  of  the  highest  profit). 
The  third and new allocation  of authority is the case of "contingent 
delegation"  or "ex post validation."  In the example  above, the prin- 
cipal  ex  post  rubber-stamps  whenever  the  highest  profit  is  B and 
overrules  when  this profit  is B. 
Contingent  delegation  is intermediate  between  delegation  and no 
delegation  in terms of initiative  and  loss of control.  Applications  of 
the  idea  of  contingent  delegation  are  not  limited  to  the  internal 
organization  of firms. In politics,  authority  over certain  decisions  is 
delegated  to a president  but may be taken away from  her at the cost 
of an impeachment  procedure.  In corporate  finance,  a board  of di- 
rectors  or a management  team  may lose  control  after a takeover  or 
a proxy fight.  (Note  that the cost  c of regaining  delegated  authority 
may or may not be a pure deadweight  loss. For example,  it may repre- 
sent  a golden  parachute  or a takeover  premium.) 
2.  Delegation  to an Intermediary 
It is sometimes  the  case  that  decisions  affecting  agents  (including 
difficult  ones  such  as restructuring  a company,  laying  off workers, 
imposing  discipline,  etc.)  are being  delegated  by company  owners 
to managers.  One  explanation  for this  (which  again  can be formal- 
ized  using  a straightforward  extension  of our model)  may simply be 
that  by delegating  decision  rights  to  managers  or  supervisors  with 
intermediate  (in terms of congruence)  objectives  between  hers and 
her  agents',  the  principal  commits  herself  to limiting  the  expected 
cost for the agents  of being  deprived  of formal  decision  rights. This, 
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and initiative while at the same time limiting the expected cost of 
her losing formal authority and thus direct control over decisions. 
E.  Authority  and Communication 
This subsection extends the basic framework  by introducing the pos- 
sibility  that the agent communicates some prior information he may 
privately  hold about the projects.  A natural question then is whether 
the allocation of formal authority  affects the communication of (rel- 
evant) information by the agent. 
We assume that at the beginning the agent can communicate in- 
formation that reduces the principal's marginal cost of investigation 
from g' to g' such that g'(E)  >  &(E)  for all E >  0. (For example, 
the agent might privately  know that the relevant projects belong to 
a subset N1  of N and decide whether to reveal N1 to the principal.) 
The action of communicating information to the principal is non- 
contractible. The timing is as described in Section II except that the 
agent chooses whether to communicate his private information to 
the principal after the allocation of the decision right. Then the two 
parties choose noncooperatively how much effort (E and e) to invest 
in learning the projects' payoffs. Depending  on  the allocation of 
formal authority, the equilibrium efforts are given by the first-order 
conditions (5) - (8) for the relevant marginal disutility  of effort func- 
tion for the principal (gp(.) or &()). 
Communication shifts the principal's reaction curve up (regard- 
less of the allocation of formal authority) and has no effect on the 
agent's reaction curve. The principal's monitoring effort E thus in- 
creases in a stable equilibrium. The question of whether the agent 
wants to communicate information to the principal thus boils down 
to whether the  agent gains from the  principal's being  better in- 
formed. Without loss of generality, let us index the principal's mar- 
ginal disutility  function by a communication parameter Kr= [0, 1], 
hp(E,  K) with hp(E,  0)  =  g'(E)  and hp(E,  1) =  gp(E) for all E and 
hp(E,  K) decreasing in K. We just noted that the principal's equilib- 
rium efforts E(K)  and Ed(K)  increase with K. From the envelope 
theorem, the impact of communication on the agent's utility (see 
eqq. [2] and [4])  is given by 
dUA  dE 
d-  =  (P -  e)b-  (10) 
dK  dK  (0 
and 
du  -=  (1 -  ed)bd  .  (11) 
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An  independent  agent  always benefits  from  the  principal's  being 
better  informed.'7  In contrast,  a subordinate  wants to communicate 
information  if his  expected  gain  from  the  superior's  becoming  in- 
formed,  fib, exceeds  the expected  benefit  from having real authority, 
eb, or  0  >  e. When  the  congruence  parameter  f is low, f <  e,'8 so 
the  agent  is better  off  not  communicating  his  information.  In  case 
of low congruence,  there  is more communication by an independent agent. 
In this framework,  there  is actually always at least as much  commu- 
nication  under  A-formal authority.  This  may no  longer  be  the  case 
if congruence  is high  and  the  agent  incurs  a direct  (fixed)  cost  of 
communicating  the information,  as can be seen from equation  (10). 
The  agent  no longer  derives a benefit  from  the principal's  being  ex 
ante  well  informed  if he  himself  is well  informed  (ed  close  to one). 
If the agent's  private benefit  is high  enough  so that ed is indeed  close 
to one,  the  independent  agent  does  not  bother  incurring  the  cost 
of  communicating  ex  ante  information.  In  contrast,  it may be  the 
case  (this can be checked  with quadratic payoffs)  that, provided  that 
congruence  is high  enough, 
dUA  dud 
~~>  ~~-0.  (12) 
dK  dK 
In summary,  the allocation  of formal  authority  affects  the agent's 
incentives  to communicate  prior  information  to the  principal.  The 
impact  of the  allocation  of formal  authority  on  communication  de- 
pends  on  the  parameters  of  the  model,  in  particular  the  degree  of 
congruence  between  the principal's  and the agent's  objectives.  More 
communication  may  take  place  under  P-formal  authority  if  these 
objectives  are  sufficiently  congruent;  less  communication  will  take 
place  if they  are too  dissonant. 
V.  Factors Favoring Initiative When the Principal 
Has Formal Authority 
In this section,  we assume  that full delegation  of formal  authority  is 
dominated,'9  and we explore  a few determinants  of the  agent's  real 
17 That communication can never  be detrimental to an independent agent is un- 
likely to be robust to various extensions of our basic model, in particular, to the 
introduction of the agent's responsiveness  to monetary incentives. For example, one 
could imagine that an independent agent might prefer not to help the principal find 
out that the two parties'  preferences are congruent in order to credibly  blackmail  the 
principal ex post and thereby obtain a higher monetary compensation. 
18 One has limao  e =  gA-'  [ Li-g'  (B) ] b] >  0, and e as defined by (5) and (6) 
is increasing in a. Thus e remains uniformly bounded away  from zero as a varies. 
19  For example, there might be states of nature in which the agent could impose 
very  bad decisions for the principal (i.e., in which a is very  negative) if formal author- 
ity were delegated to him. FORMAL  AND  REAL AUTHORITY  19 
authority  under centralization by extending the basic model in a few 
simple directions. 
A.  Span of Control, Overload, and Initiative 
It is often argued that the planning and allocation process of the 
large conglomerates that were formed in the 1960s became bureau- 
cratized and that the headquarters were responsible for too many 
units, whose strategy they could not understand or influence. This 
called for a refocus on "core businesses." The purpose of this sub- 
section is to introduce the superior's span of control and overload 
into the analysis.  Suppose that a superior has authority  over m identi- 
cal subordinates. Each subordinate i screens in a set of tasks as de- 
scribed in Section II and learns the corresponding payoff structure 
with probability ej. The principal's disutility of efforts is gp(Xi Es), 
where Ej  is the principal's probability  of learning the payoffs  of agent 
i's activity.  The subordinates' tasks  are independent. There is a fixed 
cost f per subordinate.20  So, the principal's payoff is 
Up  [EiB +  (1  -  E)  eixB-  f]  -  gp(  EZ)  (13) 
Each agent's reaction curve is still given by 
(1  -  E) b =  gA(ei).  (14) 
We assume that the equilibrium is symmetric2'  and stable: 
(1  -  ae) B =  g(mE),  (15) 
(1 -  E)b=  gA(e).  (16) 
Let {E(m),  e(m)}  denote  the  solution  to  the  system of equations 
{(15),  (16)1. Abusing notation, let 
up(m)  mR(E(m),  e(m))  -  gp(mE(m)), 
where 
R(E(m),  e(m))  )E(m)  B +  [ 1-  E(m)  ] e(m)  cB -  f 
is the revenue per subordinate. When the envelope theorem is used 
and m is treated as a real number, the optimal span of control is 
20 The superior would choose to have an infinite number of subordinates in the 
absence of a fixed cost (or, equivalently,  of a positive reservation  wage of the subordi- 
nates).  A finite  size  is obtained  when  f  >  [g6' (b) ] aB. 
21 There also exist asymmetric equilibria in which the principal devotes all her 
attention to a subset of agents, who therefore lack initiative,  and none to the others. 
To eliminate asymmetric  equilibria, one can assume that the probabilities lEJ are 
sufficiently nonsubstitutable in the principal's disutility of effort function. 20  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
obtained  from 
du-  [R(E(m),  e(m))  -  E(m) g(mE(m))]  +  m  -  =  0.  (17) 
dm  3ae  dm 
The  expression  in brackets  in  (17)  is the marginal  profit  associated 
with  a unit  increase  in  the  span  of  control.  An  extra  agent  brings 
revenue  R but  requires  attention  E, which  raises  the  cost  of  super- 
vision  by Egp, the  "overload  cost."  The  second  term,  in  (aR/ae) 
X  (de/dm)  >  0, is the  "initiative  effect"  and  measures  the  increase 
in  the  agent's  effort  associated  with  a reduction  in oversight. 
We shall say that a firm is in a situation  of overload  if the marginal 
profit of an extra employee,  with employee  behavior  held  constant, 
is negative.  Equation  (17)  shows  that  it is always optimal  for the  firm 
to be in a situation of overload  so as to  credibly  commit  to rewarding 
initiative.44 
Remark.-The  analysis  in  this  subsection  has  an  interesting  dy- 
namic  application:  Suppose  that  the  implementation  of  projects 
takes  place  continuously  over  time  and  that  at each  point  in  time 
the principal  can freely adjust the span of control  by hiring  or firing 
subordinates.  Assume  furthermore  that the principal  acquires  expe- 
rience  about  her  subordinates  as time  passes  by  (there  is learning 
by doing  in monitoring).  Then  the trade-off between  overload  costs 
and initiative has the following  dynamic  equivalent:  Letting  the firm 
grow  fast  (i.e.,  hiring  new  subordinates  at  a  high  speed)  involves 
high  overload  costs and therefore  a loss of control  for the principal; 
on  the  other  hand,  a slow-growth  policy  is more  likely to  stifle  the 
subordinates'  initiative as the principal  acquires experience  on mon- 
itoring  them. 
B.  Performance  Measurement  and Subordinates' 
Responsiveness  to Monetary  Incentives 
The economics  literature  has emphasized  the effect of the allocation 
of control  on  incentives.  This  subsection  shows that incentives  feed 
back on  control.  To this purpose,  we generalize  our  theory  to allow 
the agent  to respond  to monetary  incentives.  The profit is verifiable, 
and  the  agent's  utility for  project  k is u(w)  +  bk (where  u (0)  =  0, 
22 Because the marginal profit is negative, the principal would be better off com- 
mitting herself, say,  to playing  golf rather than reaching overload. The problem with 
this is that playing golf is not a credible commitment (recall that the gp(-) function 
summarizes the principal's disutility of supervision and therefore already includes 
the cost of forgone opportunities). Overload is a credible commitment not to stifle 
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u'  >  0,  and  u" <  0).  We  assume  for  simplicity  that  there  are  two 
relevant projects, with profits B and zero,  respectively,  which  implies 
that a  =  P. Without  loss of generality,  the agent  receives  w '  0 when 
the  principal's  profit  is B, and  zero  otherwise. 
The  principal's  net  profit  in  her  preferred  project  is  now  B-3 
B  -  w. The  agent's  average  gain  from  being  informed  and  having 
real  authority  is  b  b +  au(w)  for  u(w)  <  b and  b-=u(w)  +  ab 
for  u (  w) '  b: When  u (  w) <  b, the  agent  always picks his preferred 
decision;  when  there  is congruence,  the agent  also receives  wage  w. 
The  case u(w)  '  b can be labeled  "aligned  incentives."  The  agent's 
monetary  incentives  are powerful  enough  that he forgoes  his private 
benefit  and  always recommends  the  principal's  preferred  decision. 
Note  that it is never optimal  for the principal  to set a wage just below 
u1 (b), because  she can obtain  congruent  decision  making by raising 
the wage  slightly. 
The reaction  curves (5) and  (6) under  P-formal authority become 
(1  -cae)B  =  gp(E)  (18) 
and 
(1  -E)  bg(e).  (19) 
The  main conclusion  of this section  can be drawn from  these  two 
equations.  A higher wage increases  real authority  for two reasons:  First, by 
raising  the  agent's  incentives,  it makes  it more  likely that the  agent 
will be  able  to recommend  a project.  Second,  it reduces  the  princi- 
pal's  incentive  to  monitor  and  therefore  the  probability  that  the 
principal  overrules  the  agent. 
Let {E(w),  e(w)} denote  the  solution  of {(18),  (19)).  Then  the  de- 
rivative of  the  principal's  profit  with respect  to  w is 
=  (1-E)a(B-w)--  [E +  (1-E)ea].  (20) 
dw  dw 
The  first term  on  the  right-hand  side  of  (20)  corresponds  to  the 
increase  in  initiative.  The  second  term  reflects  the  increase  in  the 
wage  bill.  The  optimal  wage  (when  incentives  are  not  aligned)  is 
equal  to zero  if a  is small,  but  should  be  positive  in general.23 
23 The equilibrium may not be immune to the possibility of renegotiation. For 
suppose that the principal and the agent have ex ante agreed on a wage w and that 
the agent has learned the payoffs  but the principal has not. Suppose that b >  u(w). 
Suppose further that the agent's information is hard information. (It is equally 
straightforward  to study the case of soft information.) In case of noncongruence, 
the principal must raise the wage to w* -  u-'(b) in order to get a profit. She will 
be willing to do so if w* <  B. While renegotiation occurs, the principal may not 
want to commit to wage w* ex ante, because she can get away  with a lower wage 
when she herself is informed or when the projects are congruent. The analysis is 
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Remark  1. -Dual  top  management  approach.  -Chandler  (in "Execu- 
tive Roundtable"  [1993, pp.  54-58])  observes that at  (generally 
deemed successful) General Electric during the 1980s, the managers 
of  the  "core"  businesses-the  long-established,  mature  busi- 
nesses-received  little planning or attention from the corporate of- 
fice and were run instead through strict monetary incentives (bud- 
gets and budget-based bonuses). The corporate office, in contrast, 
was  very  involved in the high-tech businesses (aerospace, aircraft  en- 
gines, and medical equipment), for which monetary incentives are 
harder to design (because of the uncertainty and the novelty of the 
products).  Our argument that better performance measurement 
raises an agent's real authority offers a rationale for this so-called 
dual top management approach. 
Remark  2.-Our  analysis  in this section also suggests that the tran- 
sition from "U-form" to "M-form"  in large U.S. companies such as 
Du Pont or General Motors is likely to have induced by itself a trans- 
fer in real authority toward division managers. Indeed, by creating 
autonomous "profit centers," the new M-form  organizations could 
yield more precise information about each division head's perfor- 
mance because they avoided "moral hazard in teams" problems be- 
tween product and functional divisions. It thus became easier to use 
monetary incentives or career concerns in order to foster the divi- 
sion head's initiative (see Aghion and Tirole  [1995] for more on 
the link between M-forms  and initiative). 
C.  Multiple Principals 
Having multiple principals is generally believed to affect an agent's 
behavior. While providing a full treatment of this topic lies out of 
the scope of this paper (see Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi [1994] 
for a number of interesting developments in the area of corporate 
finance), a short discussion already  yields a number of useful obser- 
vations. There are two dimensions to the deconcentration of owner- 
ship: returns and authority. 
Splitting  returns.-The  benefit, provided that it is monetary, can 
be split among several  principals. Consider, for instance, the case of 
n equal partners (or "co-owners"), each entitled to receive 1/n  of 
the return of the project. We assume the same cost function for all 
principals.  The set of principals as a whole is informed if any of them 
is. Because they all want to maximize profit, the allocation of author- 
ity among them is irrelevant. Each principal's and the agent's reac- 
tion curves are given by, respectively, 
(1  -  E) n  1 (1  -  ea)  =  gp(E)  (5') 
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and 
(1  -  E)nb =  gA(e).  (6') 
Spreading  monetary  benefits  among  several principals  has two ef- 
fects  on  initiative.  First, it  generates  free  riding  and  therefore  re- 
duces  monitoring.  This  effect  dominates  when  the  principal's  cost 
function  is not too convex,  as is the case, for instance,  for a quadratic 
cost.24 In  this  case,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  principals  raises 
initiative  and results  in a loss of control.  On  the  other  hand,  with a 
very convex  cost  function,  the  multiplication  of  monitors  substan- 
tially improves  the  monitoring  structure,  which  may reduce  initia- 
tive.25 
Splitting authority.-Splitting  authority  among  several  principals 
obviously  has  no  consequence  if  the  principals'  objectives  are 
aligned  as  in  the  previous  example.  But  authority  is  often  split 
among  principals  with  imperfectly  aligned  objectives  (marketing 
and manufacturing  divisions in a matrix organization,  multiple  min- 
istries,  chambers  in  Congress,  partners  in  a joint  venture,  or credi- 
tors in  a bankruptcy  process).  Who  has  real  authority  then  hinges 
on  the  matrix  of  congruence  parameters  among  principals  and 
agent,  as well as on the governance  mechanism  (e.g.,  each  principal 
can have veto power,  or there  can be majority voting with or without 
the participation  of the agent).  Depending  on  these  considerations, 
the  agent's  initiative  may be  enhanced  or  reduced  by the  split  of 
authority.  A conflict  of interest  among  principals  may increase  the 
probability  of veto by one  of them.  It may also raise each  principal's 
incentive  to become  informed  and  not  to rely on  the  other  princi- 
pals' recommendations.  On the other  hand,  for more  collegial  deci- 
sion  processes,  the  agent  may be  able  to "play" his multiple  princi- 
pals  against  each  other  and  thereby  get  his  way  (see  Davis  and 
Lawrence  [1977]  for  a description  of  such  behaviors). 
24  To show this, rewrite (5') and (6') in terms of the probability  Z that the princi- 
pals be informed: Let E(%, n)  be defined by (1  -  E)  =  1 -  Z.  The first-order 
conditions are then 
1 -  (1-  ea)B=  nIl[-  E(%, n)]gp(E(Z,  n))  (5") 
and 
(1  -f=  gA(e).  (6") 
In the (%,  e) space, an increase in n shifts  only the principals'  reaction curve, through 
a change in the right-hand side of  (5"). We leave it to the reader to check that, 
for a quadratic gp function, the right-hand side of (5") increases with n. 
25 This point is most easily demonstrated with the following functions: gp(E) =  0 
for E '  E0, =  -c for E > E0.  Then the probability  that the principals are informed, 
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D.  Reputation and Forbearance  of Formal Authority 
As is usual,  an  alternative  to  contracting  or  authority  allocation  is 
reputation.  In practice,  superiors  try to develop  reputations  for "not 
intervening  too often"  or for "intervening  only when justified."  For 
conciseness,  we  shall  not  develop  a  formal  model  of  reputation 
building,  but  it is straightforward  to do  so along  familiar  lines.  We 
can sketch  the broad idea of "intervening  only when justified. " Sup- 
pose  that  the  superior  faces  a sequence  of  agents.  For each  agent, 
the  payoff  structure  is  as  described  above  except  that  with  some 
probability  a  noncongruent  project  imposes  a  nonnegligible  ex- 
pected  loss  on  the  principal  instead  of  yielding  nonnegative  ex- 
pected  profit. For incentive  purposes,  it may then  be optimal  for the 
superior  to commit  to overruling  the agent  only if the noncongruent 
project  yields  a negative  profit,  in  that overruling  in  the  other  case 
is ex post  optimal  for the principal  but reduces  initiative  too  much 
to be  worth  it  (A-formal  authority  would  be  optimal  in  Sec.  IVA). 
A patient  superior  facing  enough  subordinates  may then  develop  a 
reputation  for  overruling  agents  only  if the  noncongruent  project 
yields a negative  profit.  So,  the superior  uses her authority  to overrule  the 
subordinate  "in important  matters,  " but voluntarily  relinquishes  this author- 
ity (which is different  from rubber-stamping)  in matters  that are less impor- 
tant to her. This behavior  would  not  be  credible  in a one-shot  situa- 
tion,  in  which  the  superior  would  systematically  overrule  when 
informed. 
E.  Urgency  and Delegation 
It is sometimes  observed  that the need  to adapt quickly to customer 
requirements  has forced  firms to decentralize  decision  making  (see, 
e.g.,  the discussions  of Wyman and Gordon  and WalMart in "Execu- 
tive Roundtable"  [ 1993]).  This subsection  has two purposes: It offers 
some  insights  into  how delegation  might  be affected  by the urgency 
of  the  decision,  and  it illustrates  the  case  in which  the  agent's  and 
principal's  investigations  are  sequential (rather  than  simultaneous). 
We  shall  formalize  the  urgency  of  the  decision  by the  length  of  a 
product  life cycle, but several alternative interpretations  are possible. 
Suppose  that the superior  can investigate  only once  the project  pro- 
posal  has  been  made.  Let  T denote  the  horizon,  that  is,  the  time 
elapsed  between  the  proposal  (date  0)  and  the  date  at which  the 
product  becomes  obsolete.  Abusing  terminology,  we shall let Tstand 
for the product  life cycle. The  project  yields profit  B if the principal 
is informed  at date  t (aB  if she  is not)  per unit  of time between  the 
starting  date  for  production  t '  0  and  date  T, at  which  time  a FORMAL AND  REAL AUTHORITY  25 
superior  substitute  arrives  on  the  market.  It  yields  zero  before 
date  t. 
The  principal's  decision  problem  consists  in choosing  a stopping 
time S E [0, T] at which  to start production  even if her investigations 
have  not  been  successful  by  then.  Waiting  longer  gives  her  more 
time for monitoring;  that is, the probability  that the principal  learns 
the payoffs herself  before  some  date  t,  Flt),  is increasing,  with den- 
sity ftc).  There  are,  however,  decreasing  returns  in monitoring,  so 
the  hazard  rate f(t)  /  [ 1  -  F(t)  ]  is decreasing.  Let  us  assume  that 
the  agent's  information  is soft.  (For the  only  time  in  this paper,  it 
actually makes a difference  whether  the information  is soft or hard.) 
For a given  stopping  rule  S, the  principal  obtains  flow  profit  B be- 
tween  the date of learning  t and  T if she learns payoffs at t <  S, and 
she  has  expected  flow  profit  aB  between  S and  T if  she  has  not 
learned  payoffs by date S and thus rubber-stamps  the agent's  project 
at date  S. The  principal's  utility,  conditional  on  the  agent's  having 
proposed  a project,  is therefore26 
4p=  B  (  )f(t)  dt  +  aB[1  -F(S)]]  (), 
where  ris the principal's  rate of time preference.  This objective func- 
tion  is quasi-concave,  and  the  optimal  stopping  time  either  is zero 
if 
a__,  f(O)  1-erT 
1-a  1-F(O)  r 
(for  a  large  enough,  the  principal  rubber-stamps  without  even 
checking)  or is given  by the  first-order  condition 
f(s)  e-_rT__S 
1  -  F(S)  (1-a  [  .r  (21) 
The  left-hand  side of  (21)  is the marginal  cost of delaying  the intro- 
duction  of  the  product  (divided  by B); its right-hand  side  is equal 
to the  conditional  density  of discovering  the payoffs times  the value 
of  overruling  the  agent's  choice  between  S and  T (divided  by B). 
The  optimal  stopping  time  if strictly positive  increases  with  T (1  > 
as/a T >  0)  and decreases  with a  (aS/laa  <  0),  as we would  expect. 
Our  main  result  is that for a short  horizon,  the  principal  conducts 
26  In this formulation, the principal's cost of investigating  is simply  forgone profit 
due to delayed introduction of the product. The sequential model can also be formu- 
lated with a more standard disutility of the principal's effort. 26  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
a  cursory  investigation.  That is, the principal is more likely to rubber- 
stamp, the more  urgent the decision. 
Finally,  we have been silent about the agent's behavior in that we 
have implicitly assumed that his search time (which could be ran- 
dom) was exogenously given. In general, this time could depend on 
the urgency of the decision due to altered incentives of the agent. 
Another interesting question (in a world of random time of acquisi- 
tion  of  information  by the  agent)  is whether  the  agent  would. ever 
want to delay a proposal. Delaying the proposal delays the date of 
adoption  (recall that aS/  aT  <  1) but also reduces the probability 
of being overruled (because a SaT  >  0). Clearly, an agent with a 
congruent  project  would  not  want  to  delay  the  proposal,  but  an 
agent  with  a noncongruent  project  might.  In  this  case,  a late  pro- 
posal  could  signal  a noncongruent  project  and be given  substantial 
attention by the principal (since aSlaa  <  0). A formal treatment 
of this lies outside the scope of this paper. 
F.  Testing the Determinants of Real Authority 
While we all have personal experience with some determinants of 
real authority,  it is harder to come up with more systematic  evidence. 
The key issue is, of course, the  measurement  of real authority. The 
analysis  above suggests that organizational characteristics  such as the 
span of control, the concentration of ownership, and the number 
of principals and supervising layers are directly relevant for measur- 
ing (or assessing) the real authority enjoyed by subordinates within 
a firm. In addition, one may use questionnaires, look ex post at the 
nature of the decisions (e.g., is the decision appealing to the project 
engineers  who  make a recommendation  to  the  managers?) and 
whom they benefit, count the number of times the agents are over- 
ruled (although here one must correct for the self-censorship that 
occurs when one agent knows that his preferred project will not go 
through),  or find out who gets courted in  the organization (the 
holders of substantial  real authority). Such approaches to measuring 
real authority require much  more  careful attention than can be 
given here. 
Evidence about real authority can also be read indirectly, for in- 
stance from courts' assessment of the extent of real authority. Con- 
sider the issue of liability  in a hierarchy that exerts a negative exter- 
nality on a third party. The legal literature on  "vicarious" liability 
rules reflects the view that in situations in which the principal has 
direct power of intervention  (i.e.,  has formal authority) and the 
agent has limited ability to pay for damages, the principal should 
(also) be held responsible (see Shavell [1987, chap. 7] for a state- FORMAL AND  REAL AUTHORITY  27 
ment  of  the  argument).  However,  the  idea  that liability  rules  (i.e., 
the  extent  to which  the  principals]  must  be  held  responsible  for 
damages  to third parties)  should  also accommodate  organizational 
characteristics  that  affect  real  authority  is  becoming  increasingly 
popular  among  legal specialists  (see Strasser and Rodosevich  [1993] 
for  an  extensive  account  of  the  courts'  view  in  this  respect).  Ac- 
cording  to  that  view,  directors,  parent  companies,  or  creditors 
should  be held  more  liable  if they are involved  in a smaller  number 
of  activities  or with  a smaller  number  of agents  (or  subsidiaries).27 
VI.  Summary 
Let us summarize  our main points.  (a)  In an organization,  the dele- 
gation  of  formal  authority  to  a subordinate  will both  facilitate  the 
agent's  participation  in the  organization  and  foster  his incentive  to 
acquire  relevant  information  about  the corresponding  activities. On 
the  other  hand,  delegation  involves  a costly loss  of  control  for  the 
principal.  As a result  of  this overall  trade-off, we found  that formal 
authority  is more  likely to be  delegated  for  decisions  (or activities) 
that are relatively unimportant  for the principal;  for which  the prin- 
cipal  can  trust  the  agent;  that  are  important  to  the  agent,  either 
because  private  benefits  are  high  or because  the  principal  cannot 
refrain  from  hurting  the  agent;  and  that  are  sufficiently  "innova- 
tive" that the principal  has not accumulated  substantial  prior exper- 
tise or competency.  (b) We have shown  that centralization  (the non- 
delegation  of formal  authority)  may jeopardize  communication  by 
making  the agent  concerned  about being  overruled,  although  it can 
also  favor  communication  when  the  agent  trusts his  superior.  (c) 
Finally, we have identified  factors  that may increase  a subordinate's 
real authority: large span of control,  urgency,  reputation  for moder- 
ate interventionism,  performance  measurement,  and multiple  prin- 
cipals. There  doubtless  are other  factors,  the investigation  of which 
we leave  for future  research. 
This  paper  aims only  at being  a first step  toward a more  general 
theory  of authority  and its delegation.  There  are many desirable  ex- 
27 Our analysis also suggests that liability rules that allocate much responsibility 
to principals in integrated structures  may have undesirable consequences "ex ante" 
when we allow for an endogenous choice of the authority structure. Such liability 
rules may indeed induce excessive divestiture in situations in which coordination 
considerations would naturally  favor the emergence of integrated structures. (Such 
phenomena appear to have occurred in the United States  following the introduction 
of the new environmental liability  rules [see Ringleb and Wiggins 1990].) There is 
thus a trade-off  between making the owners or managers in integrated firms respon- 
sible and at the same time avoiding inefficiencies in the allocation of formal au- 
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tensions,  such  as allowing  for multilayered  hierarchies  and studying 
the  complex  webs  of  authority  relationships  in  organizations.  The 
analysis of this and other  exciting  questions  related  to authority  and 
its delegation  must  await future  research. 
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